Estafa postdating check
On January 24, 1971, the group broke through the enclosure.
Marcos (Ferdinand), appeals from that portion of the amended judgment of the first circuit court entered in favor of the plaintiffs-appellees/cross-appellants the Estate of Rogelio (aka Roger) Domingo Roxas (the Roxas Estate) and the Golden Budha Corporation (GBC) (collectively, the plaintiffs-appellees) and against the Marcos Estate.Armed with Fuchugamis description of his fathers maps and Ocubos representations, Roxas organized a group of partners and laborers to search for the treasure and obtained a permit for the purpose from Judge Pio Marcos, a relative of Ferdinand.Judge Marcos informed Roxas that, in accordance with Philippine law, a thirty-percent share of any discovered treasure would have to be paid to the government.Accordingly, we remand for a new trial on the limited question of the proper valuation of the converted property.Finally, we hold that the circuit court abused its discretion in failing to award prejudgment interest to GBC with respect to the damages resulting from the conversion of Roxass property.Accordingly, we reverse that portion of the circuit courts amended judgment concerning damages for conversion.
In their cross-appeal, the plaintiffs-appellees argue that the circuit court erred in: (1) ruling, as a matter of law, that conversion of property is a condition precedent to the imposition of a constructive trust and the commission of a fraudulent conveyance with respect to the property; (2) instructing the jury that the proper measure of damages for the conversion of the gold bars and the golden buddha was the value of the bars at the time of conversion rather than the highest value of the gold between the time of the conversion and the time of trial; and (3) failing to award prejudgment interest to the Roxas Estate and awarding inadequate prejudgment interest to GBC.
Sometime in 1970, Roxass group began digging on state lands near the Baguio General Hospital.
After approximately seven months of searching and digging 24 hours a day, the group broke into a system of underground tunnels.
The plaintiffs-appellees cross-appeal from: (1) that portion of the amended judgment (a) entered in favor of Imelda, in her individual capacity, and against the plaintiffs-appellees and (b) ordering the Marcos Estate to pay damages for conversion in the amount of $22,001,405,000.00; (2) the circuit courts order granting in part and denying in part the plaintiffs-appellees motion for an award of prejudgment interest; and (3) the circuit courts order granting in part and denying in part the plaintiffs-appellees motion to alter the judgment.
Imelda argues that the circuit court erred in: (1) amending the judgment to substitute Imelda as the personal representative of the Marcos Estate and entering judgment against her in that capacity; (2) denying Imeldas motions for directed verdict and judgment notwithstanding the verdict, argued on the grounds that (a) the Roxas Estates claims against the Marcos Estate were barred by (i) the statute of limitations, (ii) the act of state doctrine, (iii) the head of state doctrine, and (iv) lack of personal jurisdiction, and (b) there was insufficient evidence to support the Roxas Estates claims for (i) conversion, (ii) false imprisonment, and (iii) damages; (3) failing to give preclusive effect to the opinion of a Philippines trial court regarding the authenticity of the golden buddha; and (4) admitting hearsay evidence under the co-conspirators exception of Hawaii Rules of Evidence (HRE) Rule 803(a)(2)(C) (1993). HRE Rule 803 provides in relevant part that [t]he following [is] not excluded by the hearsay rule, even though the declarant is available as a witness: A statement that was offered against a party and was uttered by a co-conspirator of the party during the course and in furtherance of the conspiracy. Imeldas points of error (2)(a)(i), (2)(a)(ii), (2)(a)(iii), (2)(a)(iv), (2)(b)(i), (2)(b)(ii), (3), and (4) are without merit.
With regard to her first point of error, we hold that Imeldas purported substitution as personal representative of the Marcos Estate was ineffective to bind the Marcos Estate but that her conduct during these proceedings judicially estops her from denying personal liability to the extent of her interest, as an heir, in the Marcos Estate.